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Abstract
An integrated monopoly, where all complements forming a composite good are oﬀered by a
single ﬁrm, is typically welfare superior to a complementary monopoly. This is the tragedy
of the anticommons. We consider the possibility of competition in the market for each
complement. We present a model with two perfect complements and introduce n imperfect
substitutes for one and then for both complements. We prove that, if one complementary
good is produced by a monopolist, and if competition for the other complement does not vary
the average quality in the market, then an integrated monopoly is still superior. In such case,
favoring competition in some sectors, leaving monopolies in others would be detrimental for
consumers and producers alike. Competition may be preferred if and only if the substitutes
of the complementary good diﬀer in their quality, so that as their number increases, average
quality and/or quality variance increases. Results change when competition is introduced
in each sector. In this case, if goods are close substitutes, we ﬁnd that competition may be
welfare superior for a relatively small number of competing ﬁrms in each sector, even with
no quality diﬀerentiation.
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1 Introduction
A complementary monopoly is characterized by the presence of multiple sellers, each producing
a complementary good. It has been known for quite some time in the literature that a comple-
mentary monopoly may be worse than an integrated monopoly, in which all such complementary
goods are oﬀered by a single ﬁrm (Cournot, 1838 and, more recently, Economides and Salop,
1992, Matutes and Regibeau, 1988). An individual ﬁrm producing a single complement takes
into account only the impact of a price raise on its own proﬁts, without considering the negative
externality caused to the sellers of other complementary goods. The quantity demanded would
be reduced for everyone, but each seller beneﬁts fully of an increase in its own price. As a conse-
quence, separated producers of complementary goods will set a higher price than an integrated
monopolist, thus resulting in a lower consumer surplus.1
The complementary monopoly problem is also known as the tragedy of the anticommons,
in analogy with its mirror case, the more famous tragedy of the commons and has been applied
in the legal literature to issues related to the fragmentation of physical and intellectual property
rights.2 Recently, the issue of complementarity has been brought to the attention of the eco-
nomics profession by some important antitrust cases, both in the United States and in Europe,
in particular the Microsoft case (discussed before both American and European Courts) and the
General Electric-Honeywell Case, decided by the European Commission.3 In the Microsoft case,
the American decision is especially interesting. Judge Jackson ordered the ﬁrm to divest branches
of its business other than operating systems, creating a new company dedicated to application
development. The break-up (later abandoned) would have created two ﬁrms producing comple-
mentary goods, with the likely result of increasing prices in the market. However, far from being
unaware of the potential tragedy of the anticommons, Judge Jackson motivated his decision with
the need to reduce the possibility for Microsoft to engage in limit pricing, thus deterring en-
try. Separation would have facilitated entry, possibly driving prices below pre-separation levels.4
A similar economic argument motivated the European Commission's Decision in the General
Electric-Honeywell Case. In such case, the EC indicated that the post-merger prices would be so
low as to injure new entrants, so that a merger would reduce the number of potential and actual
competitors in both markets.5
1Complementary monopoly is similar to the problem of double marginalization in bilateral monopoly, with
the important diﬀerence that here each monopolist competes side by side, possibly without direct contacts
with each other. In bilateral monopoly, the upstream monopolist produces an input that will be used by the
downstream one, who is then a monopsonist for that speciﬁc input (see Machlup and Taber, 1960).
2For an application to property rights, see Heller (1998), Buchanan and Yoon (2000) and Parisi (2002). Heller
and Eisenberg (1998) argue that patents may produce an anticommons problem in that holders of a speciﬁc patent
may hold up potential innovators in complementary sectors. Particularly, they focus on the case of biomedical
research, showing how a patent holder on a segment of a gene can block the development of derivative innovations
based on the entire gene. Emblematic, in this respect, the case of Myriad Genetics Inc., which held patents on
speciﬁc applications of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and blocked the development of cheaper breast-cancer
tests (see Paradise, 2004).
3See European Commission Decision of 03/07/2001, declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the
common market and the EEA Agreement Case, No. COMP/M.2220 - General Electric/Honeywell.
4United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d. 59 (D.D.C. 2000). See Gilbert and Katz (2001) for a
thorough analysis of the Microsoft case.
5On the possibility that an integrated monopolist engages in limit pricing to deter entry, see Fudenberg and
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Both these decisions indicate that separation may not be an issue (and may even be welfare
improving) if the post-separation market conﬁguration is not a complementary monopoly in the
Cournot's sense, i.e., the market for each complement is characterized by competition. The
higher prices due to the tragedy of the anticommons may in fact encourage entry in the market.
If competition increases suﬃciently, the resulting market structure may yield a higher welfare
than the initial integrated monopoly. The question then is how much competition is needed in
the supply of each complement in order to obtain at least the same welfare as in the original
monopoly?
Investigating the impact of competition on welfare when complementary goods are involved,
Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2007) note that, when n perfect complements are bought together
by consumers and ﬁrms compete à la Bertrand, two perfect substitutes for n − 1 complements
are suﬃcient to guarantee the same social welfare experienced when an integrated monopolist
sells all n complements. In fact, all competitors in the n − 1 markets price at marginal cost,
thus allowing the monopolist in the n-th market to extract the whole surplus, ﬁxing its price
equal to the one set by an integrated monopolist for the composite good. The tragedy of the
anticommons is therefore solved by competition.
Our analysis of competition among several composite goods maintains this framework when
it considers perfect complements. However, we extend it in several directions. First, diﬀerently
from previous literature, the competing goods are imperfect substitutes6 and are vertically dif-
ferentiated. Second, we consider the presence of substitutes in all markets for the n components.
Particularly, we consider two perfect complements, proving that, if one complementary good
is still produced in a monopolistic setting and if competition for the other complement does not
vary the average quality in the market, then an integrated monopoly remains welfare superior to
more competitive market settings. In fact, with imperfect substitutability the competing ﬁrms
retain enough market power as to set relatively high prices. As a result, the equilibrium prices of
the composite goods under competition remain always higher than in an integrated monopoly.
Hence, favoring competition in some sectors only while leaving monopolies in others may actually
be detrimental for consumers. Competition may be preferred if and only if the substitutes of
the complementary good produced competitively diﬀer in their quality, so that average quality
and/or quality variance increase as their number increases.
Results change when competition is introduced for both components. In this case we ﬁnd
that the tragedy may be solved for a relatively small number of competing ﬁrms in each sector
whenever goods are close substitutes. Not surprisingly, the higher the degree of substitutability
and the number of competitors in one sector, the more concentrated the remaining sector can
be and still produce a better performance than an integrated monopoly in terms of consumer
surplus.
The welfare loss attached to a complementary monopoly has been analyzed, among others,
by Economides and Salop (1992) who show, in a duopoly model with complements, that a merger
Tirole (2000).
6Imperfect substitutability in this case means that the cross-price elasticity is lower than own-price elasticity.
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reduces prices because it allows the coalition ﬁrm to absorb positive externalities. Gaudet and
Salant (1992) study price competition in an industry producing perfect complements and prove
that welfare-improving mergers may fail to occur endogenously. Tan and Yuan (2003) are con-
cerned with the opposite issue, i.e., they consider a market in which two ﬁrms sell imperfectly
substitutable composite goods consisting of several complementors. They show that ﬁrms have
the incentive to divest along complementary lines, because the price raise due to competition
among producers of complements counters the downward pressure on prices due to Bertrand
competition in the market for imperfect substitutes. McHardy (2006) demonstrates that, in
general, ignoring demand complementarities when breaking up ﬁrms that produce complemen-
tary goods may lead to substantial welfare losses. However, if the break-up stops limit-pricing
practices by the previously merged ﬁrm, even a relatively modest degree of post-separation entry
may lead to higher welfare than an integrated monopoly. He assumes a setting in which ﬁrms
producing the same component compete a la Cournot among them, whereas competition is a
la Bertrand among complements (i.e., among sectors). Diﬀerently from McHardy (2006), we
analyze the impact of complementarities and entry in a more consistent model, where all ﬁrms
choose prices when competiting both intra and inter layer and in such framework we also study
the impact of product diﬀerentiation and imperfect substitutability.
Previous literature on the relationship between complementary goods and market structure
is scanty and deals mostly with bundling practices (Matutes and Regibeau, 1988, Anderson and
Leruth, 1993, Denicolò, 2000, Nalebuﬀ, 2004, Alvisi et el., 2009).7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model when one sector is a
monopoly; Section 3 presents the reference cases of complementary and integrated monopoly.
Section 4 analyzes the impact of competition on welfare when one complement is produced by a
monopolist; Section 5 extends the model considering competition in the markets for all comple-
ments. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions.
2 The Model
Consider a composite good (a system) consisting of two components, A and B. The two compo-
nents are perfect complements and are purchased in a ﬁxed proportion (one to one for simplicity).
Initially, we assume that complement A is produced by a monopolist, whereas complement B
is produced by n oligopolistic ﬁrms.8 The number of competitors in each sector is exogenous.
Marginal costs are the same for all ﬁrms and are normalized to zero.9 Firms compete by setting
7Matutes and Regibeau (1988) study compatibility and bundling in markets in which complementary goods
have to be assembled into a system. Anderson and Leruth (1993) study bundling choices under diﬀerent market
structures. Denicolò (2000) analyzes compatibility and bundling choices when an integrated ﬁrm selling all
complements in a system competes with non-integrate ﬁrms, each producing a single, diﬀerent complement.
Nalebuﬀ (2004) analyzes the incentives to bundle by oligopolistic ﬁrms, showing that bundling is a particularly
eﬀective entry-deterrent strategy. On the opposite, Alvisi et el. (2009) show that, when ﬁrms sell complementary
goods, integration along complementary lines may actually be pro-competitive, favoring entry.
8We will remove this assumption later and consider a market conﬁguration in which n1 ﬁrms produce comple-
ment A, whereas n2 ﬁrms produce complement B.
9This assumption is with no loss of generality, because results would not change for positive, constant marginal
costs (see Economides and Salop, 1992).
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prices. We also assume full compatibility among components, meaning that the complement
produced by the monopolist in sector A can be purchased by consumers in combination with
any of the n versions of complement B. This assumption is made because we are interested in
the eﬀect of competition on the pricing strategies of the ﬁrms operating in the various comple-
mentary markets. If we let ﬁrms decide to restrict compatibility, competition may be limited
endogenously (for instance, the monopolist could allow combination with a subset of producers
in sector B only) and the purpose of our analysis would be thwarted.10 Finally, we assume that
the systems have diﬀerent qualities and that consumers perceive them as imperfect substitutes.11
More speciﬁcally, the representative consumer has preferences represented by the following
utility function, quadratic in the consumption of the n available systems and linear in the con-
sumption of all the other goods (as in Dixit, 1979, Beggs, 1994):
U(q, I) =
n∑
j=1
α1jq1j − 12
β n∑
j=1
q21j + γ
n∑
j=1
q1j
∑
s 6=j
q1s
+ I (1)
where I is the total expenditure on other goods diﬀerent from the n systems, q = [q11, q12, .., q1n]
is the vector of the quantities consumed of each system and q1j represents the quantity of system
1j, (j = 1, ...., n), obtained by combining q1j units of component A purchased from the monop-
olist, indexed by the number 1 (component A1), and qBj = q1j units of component B purchased
from the jth ﬁrm in sector B (component Bj).12Also, α = (α11, α12, .., α1n) is the vector of
the qualities of each system (with α1j representing the quality of system 1j, (j = 1, ...., n), γ
measures the degree of substitutability between any couple of systems, γ ∈ [0, 1], and β is a
positive parameter. The representative consumer maximizes the utility function (1) subject to a
linear budget constraint of the form
∑n
j=1 p1jq1j + I ≤M , where
p1j = pA1 + pBj , j = 1, ...., n (2)
is the price of system 1j (expressed as the sum of the prices of the single components set by ﬁrm
1 in sector A and ﬁrm j in sector B, respectively) and M is income.
10The assumption of perfect compatibility is common to many contributions in the literature on complementary
markets, see Economides and Salop (1992), McHardy (2006), Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2007).
11This implies that the consumption possibility set consists of n imperfectly substitutable systems. Later on,
when we consider n1 components in sector A, consumers will have the opportunity to combine each of these
components with any of the n2 complements produced in Sector B. We would then have n1 × n2 imperfectly
substitutable systems in the market.
12Note that when referring to a particular system, we use a couple of numbers indicating the two ﬁrms in sector
A and B, respectively, selling each component of such system. When referring instead to separate components,
we use a couple of one letter and one number, the ﬁrst indicating the sector (the component) and the second the
particular ﬁrm selling it. This might appear redundant for A1 when component A is sold by a monopolist, but it
will become useful when we introduce competition in sector A.
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2.1 Equilibrium Prices and Demand
The ﬁrst order condition determining the optimal consumption of a particular system 1k is
∂U
∂q1k
= α1k − βq1k − γ
∑
j 6=k
q1j − p1k = 0 (3)
Summing (3) over all ﬁrms in the B sector, we obtain the demand for system 1k
q1k =
(β + γ(n− 2))(α1k − pA1 − pBk)− γ
∑
j 6=k
α1j − (n− 1)pA1 −
∑
j 6=k
pBj

(β − γ) (β + γ(n− 1)) (4)
Summing the demands of all ﬁrms in sector B we obtain the total market size
Q =
n∑
j=1
q1j =
n∑
j=1
(α1j − pBj)− npA1
β + γ (n− 1) (5)
Following Shubik and Levitan (1980), to prevent changes in γ and n to aﬀect Q, we set
β = n− γ(n− 1) > 0. (6)
so that, substituting such expression into (5), the normalized market size becomes
Q = α¯− p¯B − pA1 (7)
where α¯ =
∑n
j=1α1j
n is the average quality of the n available systems and p¯B =
n∑
j=1
pBj
n is the
average price in the market for the second component.
Note that expression (7) also represents the demand function for the monopolist in sector A
- given that component A1 is part of all the n systems - so that the monopolist's proﬁt function
can be written as ΠA1 = pA1Q = (α¯− p¯B) pA1 − p2A1, whereas proﬁt for a single producer of
component B is ΠBk = pBk · qBk, where qBk = q1k is given in (4). Each ﬁrm chooses its price
to maximize its own proﬁts, taking the prices of others as given.13 Equilibrium prices for the
monopolist A1 and for the k-th oligopolist are, respectively
pMA1 =
α¯(n− γ)
n(3− γ)− 2γ (8)
pMBk =
α¯n(1− γ)
n(3− γ)− 2γ +
n(α1k − α¯)
2n− γ (9)
where the superscript M stands for monopoly in sector A. It is immediate to verify that pMA1
13The second order conditions for maximization of U(q, I) requires γ ≤ β
2
, i.e., γ < n
n+1
.
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is increasing in average quality α¯. In fact, being A1 part of all systems, an increase in their
average quality allows an higher proﬁt-maximizing price for the monopolist. pMA1 also depends
positively on the number of systems sold, n, and on the degree of substitutability between
any couple of systems, γ. As we will show below, the increase in competition in the market
of the second component (either because of a greater number of ﬁrms or of an higher degree
of substitutability among systems) reduces all oligopolistic prices, allowing the monopolist in
sector A to extract part of the surplus created by such price decrease.14 Not surprisingly, from
(9), producers of below-average quality charge lower than average prices (since (α1k − α¯) < 0),
whereas the opposite is true for producers of above-average quality. However, quality premiums
and discounts cancel out on average. In fact, the average price in the market for the second
component is
p¯B =
n∑
k=1
pMBk
n
=
α¯n(1− γ)
n(3− γ)− 2γ (10)
Combining (8) and (9), the equilibrium price of system 1k is
pM1k = p
M
A1 + p
M
Bk =
(n(2− γ)− γ)α¯
n(3− γ)− 2γ +
n (α1k − α¯)
2n− γ (11)
so that, the average system price becomes
p¯M1k = p
M
A1 + p¯B =
(n(2− γ)− γ)α¯
n(3− γ)− 2γ (12)
Finally, using (4), (8) and (9), we derive the equilibrium quantities
qM1k =
α¯(n− γ)
n(n(3− γ)− 2γ)) +
(α1k − α¯)(n− γ)
n(2n− γ)(1− γ) (13)
We are now ready to compute proﬁts and consumer welfare.
2.2 Consumer and producer surplus when sector A is a monopoly
Given (8) and (4), the monopolist's proﬁts in sector A are equal to
ΠMA1 = p
M
A1
n∑
j=1
qM1j =
α¯2(n− γ)2
(n(γ − 3) + 2γ)2 (14)
As for the k−th oligopolist's proﬁt, note ﬁrst that
pMBk = t · qM1k (15)
14It should be noted that the impact of an increase in n on pMA1 is analyzed assuming a constant α¯, which
implies that we are concentrating on mean-preserving distributions of quality across ﬁrms.
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where t = n
2(1−γ)
(n−γ) . Hence
ΠMBk = t
(
qM1k
)2
=
n2(1− γ)
(n− γ)
(
α¯(n− γ)
n(n(3− γ)− 2γ) +
(α1k − α¯)(n− γ)
n(2n− γ)(1− γ)
)2
, (16)
so that aggregate proﬁts in sector B are equal to
ΠMB =
n∑
j=1
ΠMBj = t
n∑
j=1
(
qM1j
)2
= n(1− γ)(n− γ)
(
α¯2
n(n(3− γ)− 2γ)2 +
σ2α
n(2n− γ)2(1− γ)2
)
(17)
where σ2α =
∑n
j=1(α1j−α¯)2
n represents the variance of the qualities of the n available systems.
We now turn to consumer surplus. Given the utility function in (1), consumer surplus is
deﬁned as
CS = U(q, I)−
 n∑
j=1
p1jq1j + I
 (18)
Following Hsu and Wang (2005), we can rewrite the expression above as
CS =
n(1− γ)
2
n∑
j=1
q21j +
γ
2
 n∑
j=1
q1j
2 = n(1− γ)
2
n∑
j=1
(q1j − q¯)2 + n
2
2
(q¯)2 (19)
where q¯ =
∑n
j=1 q1j
n =
Q
n is average quantity. Using (13), we can write
q¯ = A˜α¯ (20)
and
q1k − q¯ = B˜ (α1k − α¯) (21)
where A˜ = (n−γ)n(n(3−γ)−2γ) and B˜ =
(n−γ)
n(1−γ)(2n−γ) . Also, using (21),
n∑
j=1
(q1j − q¯)2 = B˜2nσ2α (22)
Finally, substituting (20) and (22) into (19), we obtain
CSM =
n2(1− γ)
2
B˜2σ2α +
n2
2
A˜2α¯2 (23)
Given that our goal is to compare equilibrium outcomes under competition and under both
an integrated and a complementary monopoly à la Cournot, in the remainder of this Section
we compare equilibrium prices and quantities under competition with those obtained under
integrated and complementary monopolies. Particularly, prices and quantities in an integrated
monopoly are pIM = αIM2 and QIM =
αIM
2 respectively, so that proﬁts and consumer surplus are
ΠIM =
α2IM
4 ; CSIM =
α2IM
8 . (24)
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In should be immediately noticed that when σ2α = 0 and the common quality level among
all systems coincides with that of an integrated monopoly (α1k = α¯ = αIM = α∗, k = 1, ..., n),
component prices in sector B are lower than the price set by the integrated monopolist, pIM ,
while system prices are higher. In fact,
pMBk − pIM = −
α∗(n− γ)
(3n− γ(2 + n)) < 0 (25)
pM1k − pIM =
α∗(n− γ(4− n))
2(3n− γ(2 + n)) > 0 (26)
for all γ ∈
[
0, nn+1
]
. Thus, competition lowers prices in the oligopolistic sector, but the monopo-
list in sector A optimally reacts to this by extracting more surplus and setting higher prices, so
that overall pM1k > pIM . This has a negative impact on the number of systems sold in the market
and, as a matter of fact, it is immediate to check that QM = nqM1k < QIM .
In a complementary monopoly, two separate ﬁrms A1 and B1 produce one component each
of the composite good (i.e., n = 1), and, in the equilibrium, set prices equal to piCM =
αCM
3 ,
i = A,B (where CM stands for complementary monopoly). Hence the equilibrium price and
quantity of the composite good are pCM = 2αCM3 and QCM =
αCM
3 . Proﬁts and consumer surplus
then are:
ΠiCM =
α2CM
9
, i = A,B; CSCM =
α2CM
18
, (27)
where CSCM < CSIM , obviously. It is easy to check that, when σ
2
α=0 and the common quality
level among all systems coincides with that of a complementary monopoly (α1k = α¯ = αCM , k =
1, ..., n), component and system prices are lower with competition than with a complementary
monopoly (i.e. pMBk < p
B
CMand p
M
1k < pCM , respectively). This implies that Q
M > QCM , even if
each oligopolist sells less than a complementary monopolist (qM1k < QCM ).
3 Competition and Welfare When Sector A is a Monopoly
In this section we verify the impact of changes in the number of ﬁrms in Sector B, n, in the
degree of substitutability among systems,γ, and in the distribution of the quality parameters
(the α1k's) on equilibrium prices and welfare.
Along the way, we will verify how the assumption of imperfect substitutability among systems
changes the impact of n on the extent of the tragedy of the anticommons with respect to the
case studied by Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2007).15
The following Lemma illustrates ﬁrst the relationship between pMBk, α¯, γ, and n.
Lemma 1. Oligopolistic prices decrease with n and γ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
15One should recall that, in their simple model, two ﬁrms competing in the market for the second component
would be enough to guarantee a surplus equal to that attained in the presence of a single, integrated ﬁrm.
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The negative relationship between pMBk, γ and n is intuitive. The higher the number of ﬁrms
in sector B and the degree of substitutability among systems, the ﬁercer the competition for the
second component and the lower the Bertrand equilibrium prices in sector B. Similarly, it is
immediate to verify from (10) that the impact of a change in n and γ on p¯B is the usual and
negative one.16
When checking the relationship between system prices pM1k, the number of ﬁrms n and the
degree of substitutability γ, we notice from (11) that it is inﬂuenced by opposite forces. On the
one hand, pMA1 increases as either n or γ increase, whereas p
M
Bk decreases. However, the following
Proposition indicates that the ﬁrst eﬀect is always smaller in magnitude than the second, so that,
overall, pM1k decreases with n and γ.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium system prices decrease with n and γ. Then, consumer surplus
increases with n and γ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When pMBk decreases because of the increased competition in the market for component B,
the monopolist's optimal response is to increase its price, given that goods A1 and Bk are
complements. However, since the monopolist sets the same price pA1 for all the n systems,
such an increase negatively aﬀects the demand of all systems. The monopolist then internalizes
such negative externality, thus limiting the increase in pA1. The same applies to the degree of
substitutability γ.
Finally, notice that the result in (26) indicates that, with a common quality value, no matter
the extent of competition in sector B (i.e., no matter n), unbundling the two components of
a system, having them sold by diﬀerent ﬁrms, always leads to higher prices compared to an
integrated monopoly. This seems to indicate that, when goods are not perfect substitutes, the
tragedy of the anticommons is never solved by introducing competition in sector B only contrarily
to what happens with perfect substitutes (Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi, 2007).17 In order to conﬁrm
such prediction, we now compare equilibrium consumer surplus with the integrated monopoly
case, establishing the following result
Proposition 2. When sector A is a monopoly and n ﬁrms compete in sector B,
1) if α1k = αIM = αCM (k = 1, ...., n), consumer surplus with competition in sector B is
always lower than with an integrated monopoly but higher than with a complementary monopoly
(CSCM < CS
M < CSIM ).
16pMBk is also negatively related to α¯. In fact, it is deﬁned for a given α1k, so that if α¯ increases it is because
the quality of some systems other than 1k has increased. In such circumstance, the ratio α1k
α¯
actually decreases,
reducing the price that ﬁrm k can charge. However, p¯B is positively aﬀected by α¯: as the average quality of the
available systems increases, their average price also increases.
17In such case, two perfect substitutes in sector B would be enough to solve the tragedy. Our conclusion seem
to contradict also the results obtained by McHardy (2006). In his paper, a very low number of competitors selling
imperfect substitutes is suﬃcient to attain the level of social welfare of a complementary monopoly, even if the
other sector remains monopolistic.
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2) if systems diﬀer in quality, then consumer surplus is higher with competition in sector B
than with an integrated monopoly if and only if
σ2α > σ
2
CS =
1
(1− γ)B˜2
[
α2IM
4n2
− A˜2α¯2
]
(28)
where σ2CS is decreasing in γ and n. If quality variance is suﬃciently high, competition may be
preferred even if α¯ < αIM .
Proof. See Appendix A.
When goods are imperfect substitutes and quality is the same across systems and market
structures, competition in one sector can certainly improve consumer welfare with respect to a
complementary monopoly, but it is never enough to solve the anticommons problem (CSM <
CSIM ). Competition can eﬀectively increase consumer surplus above CSIM only if both average
quality and variance play a role. Particularly, while it is not surprising that competition increases
consumer welfare when it also increases average quality, from (23) it can be veriﬁed that also
quality variance has a positive eﬀect. In other words, our representative consumer beneﬁts
from variety (varietas delectat). Finally, we observe that both parameters n and γ have a
negative eﬀect on σ2CS . This is because an increase in n and γ decreases equilibrium prices under
competition, thus raising consumer surplus, ceteris paribus.18
The results in Proposition 2 are shown graphically in Figure 1, presenting simulations for
diﬀerent parameter values. Panel a) illustrates a case in which n = 2, α¯ = αIM = αCM = 1 and
σ2α = 0. It shows that consumer surplus under integrated monopoly (CSIM ) is always greater
than consumer surplus under competition. Panel b) represents the same case, this time letting
the number of ﬁrms n vary and setting γ = 13 . Panel c) considers instead a case in which
σ2α = 0.25. and again α¯ = αIM = αCM = 1. It is possible to verify that now CS
M > CSIM
for a suﬃciently high value of γ. Finally, panel d) depicts the case in which average quality
under competition is slightly lower than the quality of an integrated monopoly (α¯ = 0.95 and
αIM = 1). Here, γ = 13 and variance is set suﬃciently high (σ
2
α = 0.37), so that, for n > 4, the
representative consumer prefers an oligopoly in sector B to an integrated monopoly. 19
In order to analyze equilibrium proﬁts and the corresponding producer surplus in the various
market conﬁgurations, we establish ﬁrst the following results regarding equilibrium quantities.
Lemma 2. (a) Equilibrium quantities qM1k are decreasing in n; (b) There exists αˆ1k < α¯, such
that qMik is increasing in γ for α1k > αˆ1k and is decreasing in γ for α1k < αˆ1k; (c) Total quantity
sold in the market is increasing in n and γ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
18Obviously, when αIM > α¯, the greater the gap between αIM and α¯, the greater σ
2
CS to compensate for lower
quality.
19In the simulations presented here, consumer surplus in complementary monopoly, (CSCM ), is always lower
than CSM whenever αIM = αCM . This is due to the assumption that α¯ is only slightly smaller than or equal to
αIM . If α¯ were smaller enough, we might have CS
M < CSCM , at least for low values of γ and n.
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When n increases, both oligopolistic prices and total system prices in (9) and (11) decrease
due to enhanced competition. Moreover, as assumed, such increase in the number of competiting
ﬁrms takes place leaving average quality α¯ unchanged, so that the diﬀerence α1k − α¯ is not
aﬀected by the entry of new available system. Thus, overall, demands for all systems raises
proportionately. The case in which γ changes is more complex. As γ increases, systems become
closer substitutes and their prices decrease (see Lemma 1). However, this does not necessarily
translate into a greater demand for each of them. In fact, as implied by the utility function (1),
consumers have a taste for quality so that, ceteris paribus, they prefer systems characterized by
a higher α1k. Then, as systems become closer substitutes, consumers will demand more high-
quality systems at the detriment of low-quality ones. Hence, the demand for some low-quality
systems (those with α1k < αˆ1k) decreases as γ increases. This has immediate repercussions on
proﬁts, as we will see below. Finally, and not surprisingly, given that an increase in γ or n
decreases the price of all systems, their total demand will increase as well.
The following Corollary and Proposition use Lemmas 1 and 2 to discuss and compare equi-
librium proﬁts.
Corollary 1. ΠMA1 is increasing in n and γ. Both Π
M
Bk and Π
M
B are decreasing in n.
Corollary 1 states that the monopolist in sector A always beneﬁts from an increase in competi-
tion in sector B (produced by an increase in either n or γ). This is because both the monopolist's
equilibrium price pMA1 and total demand (from Lemma 2) increase in n and γ. The Corollary also
establishes a clear relationship between individual proﬁts and the number of ﬁrms in sector B:
as n increases, competition gets ﬁercer and each ﬁrm sets a lower price, sells a lower quantity
and obtains lower proﬁts. This implies that also aggregate proﬁts in sector B decrease with n,
counterbalancing the growth in the monopolist's proﬁts in sector A. Regarding the relation-
ship between γ and ΠMBk, we know from Lemmas 1 and 2 that both p
M
Bk and q
M
1k decrease with
γ for low-quality systems, but also that qM1k increases with γ when the quality of system 1k is
suﬃciently high, i.e. α1k > αˆ1k > α¯. Then for high-quality systems such positive impact of γ on
quantities might prevail and ΠMBk can be increasing with γ. Such possibility also inﬂuences the
relationship between γ and ΠMB , as the following Proposition shows. Particularly, this is more
likely to happen when quality variance is high and then the chance of having ﬁrms in sector B
with α1k > αˆ1k is greater.
Proposition 3. If α¯ = αIM = αCM,
(a)ΠIM > ΠMA1 > Π
A
CM for any n ≥ 2 and γ ∈
[
0, nn+1
]
. When systems are perfect substitutes
(γ = 1), ΠMA1 = ΠIM > Π
A
CM ;
(b)ΠMB is increasing in γ if and only if σ
2
α is suﬃciently high;
(c) If σ2α = 0 then Π
M
B is lower than Π
B
CM and ΠIM . Also, Producer Surplus (PS ≡ ΠMB +
ΠMA1) is such that ΠIM > PS > Π
A
CM + Π
B
CM .
(d) If σ2α > 0, n = 2, then Π
M
B < ΠIM . If σ
2
α > 0, n ≥ 3, thenΠMB ≥ ΠIM for suﬃciently
high σ2α. Also, for n ≥ 2, PS ≥ ΠIM if and only σ2α is suﬃciently high..
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The positive relationship between ΠMA1 and n illustrated in Corollary 1 also explains why, as
indicated in part (a) of the Proposition, the monopolist's proﬁts are higher when sector B is
an oligopoly than when it is a complementary monopoly. Note however that the monopolist's
proﬁts are always lower than those obtained by an integrated monopolist. Only in the limit case
in which γ = 1, the monopolist in sector A is able to extract the whole surplus from sector B,
thus behaving like an integrated monopolist.20 Interestingly, whenever γ < 1, even an inﬁnite
number of competitors would not allow the monopolist to obtain the same proﬁts of an integrated
monopolist. This is because systems are not perfect substitutes, so that prices in the oligopolistic
sector remain, on average, above marginal cost.21 When quality variance in suﬃciently high, part
(b) of the Proposition indicates that the increase in proﬁts of high-quality producers more than
compensates the decrease in the proﬁts of low-quality ones, conﬁrming the intuition given above.
In the remaining two parts, the Proposition compares industry proﬁts in sector B and total
producer surplus with the respective values obtained under a complementary and an integrated
monopoly. In the simple case of a common quality level (part (c)), industry proﬁts in sector
B (and then a fortiori individual proﬁts) are smaller than both the proﬁts of a complementary
and of an integrated monopolist producing the same quality level. The relationship between ΠMB
and ΠIM is not surprising and is a direct implication of the results in section 2.2, according to
which pM1k>pIM and Q
M < QIM , no matter the number of competing ﬁrms. Once more, when
quality variance is zero, increasing the number of competitors in one sector only is not enough
to eliminate the tragedy of the anticommons. Note that in the same section we also established
that both qMBk and p
M
Bk are lower than qCM and p
B
CM , respectively, so that Π
M
Bk < Π
B
CM . Part (c)
states that this result holds in aggregate, as well, and that ΠMB < Π
B
CM : introducing competition
in sector B unambiguously lowers industry proﬁts, no matter the degree of substitutability. As
for producer surplus, results are ambivalent. On one side, the idea that post-separation entry of
new ﬁrms in sector B is never able to overcome the tragedy is supported also in terms of the
sum of all ﬁrms' proﬁts in the economy (so that ΠMB + Π
M
A1 < ΠIM ). On the other, we verify
that competition in sector B increases the proﬁts of the monopolist in sector A in a way that
more than compensates the losses in industry proﬁts in sector B, so that overall producer surplus
under competition is greater than under a complementary monopoly (ΠMB +Π
M
A1 > Π
A
CM+Π
B
CM ).
Finally, in part (d) we establish that industry proﬁts in sector B can actually be larger than
those of an integrated monopolist (and then a fortiori, of a complementary monopolist) when
variance is positive. As indicated by equation (17), the higher the quality variance, the larger
the value of aggregate proﬁts in sector B, so that it may happen indeed that ΠMB ≥ ΠIM . Then,
provided a suﬃciently large value for σ2α, producer surplus under competition might also be
greater than with an integrated monopoly.22 In conclusion, quality variance is an indicator of
20One should notice the analogy between this case and the results in Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2007).
21From (10), limn→∞p¯B =
α¯(1−γ)
3−γ > 0 if γ < 1.
22Note that, for a given average quality, variance is obviously weakly increasing in the number of ﬁrms in sector
B. In other terms, the higher n, the higher the maximum value that quality variance can take while still satisfying
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product diﬀerentiation and varietas delectat not only for consumers, but for sector B as a whole
as well. Then, joining the results in Propositions 2 and 3, the following Corollary holds
Corollary 2. (a) Total Surplus increases with quality variance. (b) When σ2α = 0 and α1k =
αIM = αCM (k = 1, ..., n), total surplus with competition in sector B is greater than with
a complementary monopoly but lower than with an integrated monopoly. (c) When σ2α > 0,
α¯ = αIM , there exists a value for σ2α such that total surplus with competition in sector B is
greater than with an integrated monopoly.
Summing up, consumers are always worse oﬀ in a complementary monopoly. They prefer
competition to an integrated monopoly if quality variance is very high, so that they can enjoy
the beneﬁts of some very high-quality goods and some lower-quality goods with little price. As
for producer surplus, total proﬁts can be higher under competition if variance is large enough.
Again, in such case some very high-quality ﬁrms are able to earn suﬃciently high proﬁts to
compensate for the low proﬁts of their low-quality competitors and for the loss in market power
due to competition vis a vis both complementary and integrated monopolies. When quality
variance is high, such possibility is actually favoured by an high degree of subtitutability, given
that in such instance ΠMB increases with γ.
Total surplus follows a similar trend. As long as quality is uniform across systems, the tragedy
prevails also in welfare terms and competition in sector B is not able to raise social welfare above
the integrated monopoly case. However, separating an integrated ﬁrm into independent units
producing one component each can be welfare improving if this generates post-separation entry
and competition for at least one component and if the competing systems in the market exhibit
enough quality diﬀerentiation. Note that in Proposition 3 we assumed that α¯ = αIM = αCM,
but our result would be qualitatively the same for α¯ 6= αIM . Particularly, competition in one
sector can still be welfare enhancing even if post-separation entry in such sector reduces average
quality, provided a suﬃciently high value for quality variance.23
In the next Section, we extend the model to consider competition in Sector A, too.
4 Oligopolies in the markets for both complements
In this Section we change the setting analyzed so far and we assume that both complements
A and B are produced in oligopolistic markets. Particularly, component A is produced by n1
diﬀerent ﬁrms, whereas component B is produced by n2 ﬁrms. Again, ﬁrms compete by setting
prices.
Since consumers can mix and match components at their own convenience, there are n1×n2
the constraints of the model (that is non-negative prices). This is the reason why this result holds only if n ≥ 3.
Two ﬁrms only in sector B are not enough to generate a suﬃciently high quality variance (or equivalently a
suﬃciently high value of the parameterαmax1k introduced in the proof of Lemma 1) such that Π
M
B ≥ ΠIM .
23In this respect, our paper integrates the main conclusion in Economides (1999), according to which separation
of the monopolized production of complementary goods may damage quality.
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systems in the market and the utility function in (1) becomes
U(q, I) =
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
αijqij − 12
β n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
q2ij + γ
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
(
qij
n1∑
z=1
n2∑
s=1
qzs − q2ij
)+ I (29)
where qij represents the quantity of system ij, (i = 1, ....., n1; j = 1, ...., n2), obtained by com-
bining qij units of component A purchased from the ith ﬁrm in sector A (component Ai), and
qij units of component B purchased from the jth ﬁrm in sector B (component Bj). Also in this
case, αij > 0 (i = 1, ..., n1; j = 1, ..., n2), γ ∈ [0, 1]. The budget constraint now takes the form∑n1
i=1
∑n2
j=1 pijqij + I ≤ M , where pij = pAi + pBj (i = 1, ..., n1; j = 1, ..., n2) is the price of
system ij.
The ﬁrst order condition determining the optimal consumption of system tk is
∂U
∂qtk
= αtk − (β − γ) qtk − γ
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
qij − ptk = 0 (30)
After some tedious algebra, we obtain the demand function for system tk
qtk =
b (αtk − pAt − pBk)− γ
∑
j 6=k
(αtj − pBj)− pAt (n2 − 1)
− γ∑
i 6=t
n2∑
j=1
(αij − pij)
(β − γ) [β + γ (n1n2 − 1)] (31)
where b = β + γ (n1n2 − 2).
As before, to prevent total market size to change with γ, n1 and n2 we normalize β as
follows24
β = n1n2 − γ(n1n2 − 1) (32)
Given that component At is possibly bought in combination with all n2 components produced
in sector B, total demand for ﬁrm t in sector A is obtained summing qtk in (31) over all possible
values of k, i.e., DAt =
∑n2
j=1 qtj . Similarly, total demand for ﬁrm k in sector B is DBk =∑n1
i=1 qik. Then, maximizing proﬁts ΠAt = pAtDAt with respect to pAt and ΠBk = pBkDBk with
respect to pBk, the equilibrium prices p
O
At and p
O
Bk (the superscript O stands for oligopoly in
both sectors) are, respectively
pOAt = Aα¯+B (α¯t − α¯) (33)
pOBk = Cα¯+D (α¯k − α¯) (34)
where α¯ =
∑n1
i=1
∑n2
j=1 αij
n1n2
is the average quality of all systems available in the market, α¯t =
∑n2
j=1 αtj
n2
is the average quality of the systems containing component t, and α¯k =
∑n1
i=1 αik
n1
is the average
quality of systems containing component k. Parameters A, B, C and D are deﬁned as follows:
A = n1(1−γ)(n2−γ)
n1n2(3−2γ)+γ2(1+n1+n2)−2γ(n1+n2) , B =
n1
2n1−γ , C =
n2(1−γ)(n1−γ)
n1n2(3−2γ)+γ2(1+n1+n2)−2γ(n1+n2) and
24The second-order condition then becomes γ ≤ n1n2
n1n2+1
.
15
D = n22n2−γ . The equilibrium price of system tk, p
O
tk = p
O
At + p
O
Bk, is therefore
pOtk = (A+ C) α¯+B (α¯t − α¯) +D (α¯k − α¯) (35)
Equilibrium quantities are
qOtk = zα¯+
αtk − α¯
n1n2(1− γ) +
α¯t − α¯
n2(2n1 − γ)(1− γ) +
α¯k − α¯
n1(2n2 − γ)(1− γ) (36)
where
z =
(n1 − γ)(n2 − γ)
n1n2(n1n2(3− 2γ) + γ2(1 + n1 + n2)− 2γ(n1 + n2)) (37)
In order to compute proﬁts, we need to calculate the total quantity of each component sold
in equilibrium. Given that component At (t = 1, ..., n1) is sold in combination with all its n2
complements, its total quantity will be
qOAt =
n2∑
k=1
qOtk =
(n1 − γ)(γ − n2)α
n1(γ(n2(2− γ)− γ) + n1((2− γ)γ + n2(2γ − 3))) +
(n1 − γ)(α¯t − α¯)
n1(2n1 − γ)(1− γ) (38)
Similarly, the total quantity of complement Bk (k = 1, ..., n2) sold in equilibrium is
qOBk =
n1∑
t=1
qOtk =
(n2 − γ)(γ − n1)α
n2(γ(n1(2− γ)− γ) + n2((2− γ)γ + n1(2γ − 3))) +
(n2 − γ)(α¯k − α¯)
n2(2n2 − γ)(1− γ) (39)
Hence proﬁts for each ﬁrm are
ΠOAt = p
O
tk · qOAt (40)
ΠOBk = p
O
tk · qOBk (41)
In our n1 × n2 model, the expression for the consumer surplus can be rewritten as
CS =
n1n2(1− γ)
2
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
(qij − q¯)2 + n
2
1n
2
2
2
q¯2 (42)
Using (36), we ﬁnd that
q¯ =
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
qOij = zα¯ (43)
so that we can deﬁne
V ar(q) =
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
(
qOij − q¯
)2
n1n2
(44)
i.e. the variance of the quantities of the systems sold in equilibrium in the whole market. Finally,
substituting expressions (43) and (44) into the deﬁnition of consumer surplus in (42), we obtain
CSO =
n21n
2
2
2
(
z2α¯2 + (1− γ)V ar(q)) (45)
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In the remainder of this section we want to investigate the impact that the introduction of
competition in sector A has on consumer surplus and on proﬁts, compared to less competitive
options, like complementary or integrated monopoly. The comparison is rather straightforward in
case all systems produced in oligopoly have the same quality of the unique system produced under
monopolistic settings (so that, by symmetry, V ar(q) = 0). For more general cases, however, the
complexity of the expressions for prices, quantities and proﬁts renders the algebraic analysis
rather diﬃcult. We will therefore perform numerical simulations.
First, we assume that V ar(q) = 0, with αtk = αIM = αCM = α∗, (t = 1, ..., n1; k = 1, ..., n2)
and we establish the following results.
Proposition 4. When both sectors are oligopolies, V ar(q) = 0, αtk = αIM = αCM = α∗
(t = 1, ..., n1; k = 1, ..., n2),
(a) CSO > CSCM ;
(b) CSO > CSIM if and only if
n1 > n
∗
1 =
(n2 − 1) γ2
n2(2γ − 1)− γ2 (46)
where n∗1 decreases both with n2 and γ.
(c) Oligopolistic proﬁts ΠAt and ΠBk are always smaller than ΠiCM , hence than ΠIM .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, when there is competition in both sectors, a competitive industry may be preferred to
an integrated monopoly even for a low number of ﬁrms in both sectors. Particularly, two ﬁrms
in both sectors may be enough to solve the tragedy if γ is suﬃciently high, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 is obtained assuming V ar(q) = 0, α∗ = 1, n1 = 2 and γ = 0.62. As it can be
readily veriﬁed, consumer surplus is always higher under competition than in a complementary
monopoly. It can be further noticed that consumer surplus under competition is increasing in n1
and lies below CSIM for low n1 but becomes larger than CSIM for n1 > 4 (n∗1 = 4.021). Part
(b) of the proposition also suggests that the degree of competition required in one sector (say,
sector A) to increase consumer surplus above CSIM decreases as either the number of ﬁrms in
the other sector or the degree of substitutability increase (as n∗1 is decreasing in both n2 and
γ). This happens because an increase in n2 and/or in γ not only reduces the prices of each
single component sold in sector B but also the prices of all systems, thus increasing consumer
welfare.25 Finally, part (c) conﬁrms the relationships among proﬁts found in the n×1 case, with
oligopolists always earning the lowest proﬁts and an integrated monopolist the highest.
If V ar(q) were positive, the value n∗1 at which CSO and CSIM cross would be lower. If
ﬁrms produce diﬀerent qualities and V ar(q) > 0, the number of competing ﬁrms required to
make consumer surplus under competition preferred to that obtained in an integrated monopoly
25As we will also see in the simulations below, oligopolists in sector A react to a decrease in the prices in the
complementary sector B by increasing their own price. Such increase is however limited, and total system prices
overall decrease.
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decreases. In fact, a positive V ar(q) increases CSO in (42), thus increasing the range of the
parameters for which CSO > CSIM .
26 The exact changes in prices, quantities, proﬁts and
welfare as the number of ﬁrms and the degree of substitutability between systems vary are
analyzed in the following simulations.
In the ﬁrst simulation we assume a common quality level for all systems (αtk = αIM = αCM =
1, t = 1, ..., n1; k = 1, ..., n2), We then consider an increase in competition in sector B, keeping the
number of ﬁrms in sector A ﬁxed at n1 = 2 thoroughout the simulation.27 Table 1.1 summarizes
the welfare obtained by consumers and producers under integrated and complementary monopoly,
whereas Table 1.2 presents the prices for ﬁrm A1 across the various market conﬁgurations and
the quantity sold of system q11.
28 The equilibrium quantity of each system falls steadily as
competition in sector B increases. As expected, the increase in n2 produces a decrease in the
prices in sector B, whereas it raises prices in sector A. This is the eﬀect of two distinct forces. On
the one hand there is the traditional cross-price eﬀect characterising complementary goods (for
which the cross-price elasticity is negative). On the other hand, the increase in competition in
sector B allows ﬁrms in sector A to take advantage of an increasing relative market power for the
provision of the essential component A. Such behavior of quantities and prices can be observed
both when the degree of substitutability among systems is relatively low (γ = 0.2) and when it
is higher (γ = 0.62). The eﬀect on welfare is diﬀerent according to the level of γ. At γ = 0.2,
consumer surplus in oligopoly is always lower than in an integrated monopoly but higher than in
a complementary monopoly. When γ = 0.62, consumer surplus in oligopoly is larger than in the
γ = 0.2 case (higher substitutability implies ﬁercer competition among systems), increases with
competition and in particular, for n2 > 4, is also larger than in an integrated monopoly. This
is the main diﬀerence with the n × 1 case: an high degree of substitutability allows consumers
to buy systems at very low prices when competition prevails in both sectors, and this happens
even when quality is uniformly distributed, so that we might indeed observe CSO > CSIM . We
then consider proﬁts. When γ = 0.2, total proﬁts in sector A increase with n2, whereas they
decrease in sector B. In sector A, the increase in prices and the larger range of complements
each ﬁrm can combine with its product more than compensate for the decrease in the quantity
demanded of existing systems. On the contrary, the decrease in prices in sector B drives this
sector's proﬁts down. The overall eﬀect is however positive, with total aggregate proﬁts across
sectors increasing with competition.29 Anyway, as in the n × 1 case, an integrated monopoly
yields the highest proﬁts, a complementary monopoly the lowest, with the competitive market
structure somewhere in the middle. When γ = 0.62, proﬁts in sector A are higher compared to
the γ = 0.2 case (and still increasing in n2), whereas proﬁts in sector B are higher than in the
γ = 0.2 case only for n2 = 2 and n2 = 3. Then they get lower (and they steadily decrease in
26Clearly, a fortiori, CSO > CSCM always when quality variance is positive.
27This is with no loss of generality, given the symmetry of the setting. Note also that we have already provided
analytical results for this case, but the simulation will serve as a benchmark.
28We have chosen ﬁrm A1 and system q11 because they are respectively always present and sold in positive
amount as n2 increases (the same applies for ﬁrms A2, B1 and B2 and quantities q12, q21, q22). Given symmetry,
the behavior of all ﬁrms and systems is the same in any case.
29Total proﬁts ΠO are obtained summing over all ﬁrms in each sector and then summing across sectors.
18
n2). Consequently, total aggregate proﬁts are U-shaped, increasing up to n2 = 4 (and reaching
the proﬁts of an integrated monopoly) and then slowly decreasing. They are however always
higher than in the γ = 0.2 case. Summing up consumer and producer surplus, we note that
competition in both sectors can be welfare enhancing compared to an integrated monopoly, even
with a common quality level across systems. Speciﬁcally, total surplus can get larger than TSIM
with a large degree of substitutability, and this is because the signiﬁcant increase in consumer
surplus above CSIM more than counterbalances the slight decrease in total proﬁts when n2 > 4.
In the second simulation we assume that ﬁrms are heterogeneous, so that the two sectors
A and B can be characterized by diﬀerent quality distributions which get reﬂected on systems'
qualities. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the entry of new ﬁrms in one sector allows the composition
of ever better systems, so that competition increases average quality in the market. To obtain
the eﬀect of quality decreasing with competition, we set αtk (t = 1, ..., n1; k = 1, ..., n2) as follows
α11 = 8 α12 = 8.5 α13 = 9 α14 = 9.5 α15 = 10
α21 = 7.5 α22 = 8 α23 = 8.5 α24 = 9 α25 = 9.5
Due to our chosen values, the set of systems {1k} (k = 1, ..., 5) has high average quality than
the set {2k} and systems denoted by higher k are better in quality. Table 2 reports equilib-
rium prices, quantities and welfare when competition increases in sector B. It can be veriﬁed
that quantity q11 still decreases with n2, although being larger than quantities q11 obtained in
simulation 1 for given γ. As argued above, quality variance increases demand.
As in Simulation 1, prices in sector A increase with n2, whereas prices in sector B decrease.
System prices however decrease in n2. Unsurprisingly, prices are higher with γ = 0.2 than with
γ = 0.62, since competition is ﬁercer in the second case. When γ = 0.2, consumer, producer
and total surplus are always higher under integrated monopoly. Things change when γ = 0.62;
now ﬁercer competition among closer substitutes leads to substantially lower system prices, thus
beneﬁtting consumers (for n2 ≥ 3). This more than compensates for the lower producer surplus
in oligopoly, so that total surplus in the latter conﬁguration is the highest. Complementary
monopoly yields the lowest surplus, both for consumers and producers. As in the previous
simulation, individual proﬁts decrease in sector B, experiencing the increase in competition,
whereas sector A takes advantage of this by increasing its own proﬁts.30
In the last simulation, we assume that competition worsens average quality in the market,
so that, the larger the number of active ﬁrms, the lower α¯, α¯t and α¯k. Again, with no loss of
generality, we assume that competition increases in sector B, whereas n1 = 2 throughout the
simulation. To obtain the eﬀect of quality decreasing with competition, we set αtk (t = 1, ..., n1;
k = 1, ..., n2) as follows31
30It should be noticed that both consumer surplus and proﬁts under monopolistic conﬁgurations increase in
n2. This happens because each oligopoly structure (for each n2) is compared with both types of monopoly at the
same average quality and here, by assumption, α¯ increases with n2.
31It should be noticed that the coeﬃcients αtk are the same as in Simulation 2, but in reversed order.
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α11 = 10 α12 = 9.5 α13 = 9 α14 = 8.5 α15 = 8
α21 = 9.5 α22 = 9 α23 = 8.5 α24 = 8 α25 = 7.5
When γ = 0.2, Table 3 shows that individual ﬁrms' and system prices decrease with compe-
tition. Interestingly, prices are declining and lower in sector A. This reverts the trend obseved
in the previous simulations, in which the sector not aﬀected by competition was able to limit
the impact or even to take advantage of the increased competition in the complementary sector.
Moreover, demand of a given system (say q11) decreases with competition. In fact, equation
(36) implies that equilibrium quantities are positively aﬀected by both the system's quality αtk
and by average qualities. For a given αtk, a decrease in average quality has a negative impact
on demanded quantity.32 However, ﬁrms in sector A enjoy higher (though declining) proﬁts;
they are still able to extract a higher surplus than their complementors operating in the more
competitive sector. Overall proﬁts are lower than their integrated monopoly counterpart but
higher than in a complementary monopoly. Consumer surplus decreases with competition: lower
prices and increased variance are not enough to compensate for the decline in quality. Again,
consumer surplus is highest in integrated monopoly and lowest in complementary monopoly.33
When γ = 0.62, a ﬁfth ﬁrm in sector 2 obtains no demand because of a too low quality level.
This is why the most competitive feasible market structure is at n2 = 4. System prices and quan-
tities decrease as n2 increases (and prices are lower than in the γ = 0.2 case, whereas quantities
are higher). Interestingly, comparing consumer surplus across market conﬁgurations, it can be
noticed that CSO < CSIM for n2 = 2 but CSO > CSIM for n2 ≥ 3. This happens because
the comparison is performed for the same quality level (αIM is set equal to α¯ for each value of
n2), but quality variance is increasing. Similarly to the n × 1 case, then, as variance increases,
consumer welfare might be greater in competition than with an integrated monopoly. Finally,
although pB1 has the usual pattern (as competition increases in sector B, pB1 decreases), pA1
has a non-monotonic behavior. First, it increases from n2 = 2 to n2 = 3. This is the same
behavior displayed in previous simulations; as competition increases in sector B and the price
of the complements decrease, ﬁrms in sector A react by raising their prices. However, we have
just checked that when γ = 0.2 and competition decreases quality, pA1 instead decreases in n2.
And in fact, when n2 = 4, pA1 is lower than in both the n2 = 2 and the n2 = 3 cases. What
happens is that average quality is getting so low that ﬁrms in sector A are forced to lower their
prices. The initial increase when competition is still relatively low (and average quality high) is
made possible by the high degree of substitutability γ, that renders competition especially ﬁerce
in sector B. This is not possible anymore when further competition takes quality to very low
levels. Proﬁts follow the same pattern: they increase in sector A when n2 goes from 2 to 3 but
then decrease. The ﬁercer competition due to high substitutability does not allow ﬁrms in sector
A to counteract the decline in demand due to lower average quality by reducing price as it was
32At n2 = 6 the quantity of the lowest quality systems becomes negative, implying that increased competition
is not sustainable in such market conﬁguration. That's why simulation 3 considers n2 only up to 5.
33Here consumer surplus and proﬁts under monopolistic conﬁgurations decrease in n2 since α¯ decreases with
higher n2.
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able to do when γ = 0.2. Finally, proﬁts in sector B always decrease and so do total proﬁts.
However, ΠO > ΠIM > ΠCM because of the high quality variance exogenously produced in the
simulation, and this result, combined with the trend observed for consumer surplus, produces
an increasing trend for sociale welfare. In fact, as n2 increases, total surplus increases as well,
surpassing the corresponding integrated monopoly value for n2 ≥ 3.
5 Conclusions
Complementary monopoly may be worse than an integrated monopoly, in which all such comple-
mentary goods are oﬀered by a single ﬁrm. This is the tragedy of the anticommons. We have
considered the possibility of competition in the market for each complement, presenting a model
in which n imperfect substitutes for each perfect complement are produced. We have proven
that, if at least one complementary good is produced in a monopoly, an integrated monopoly
is always superior to a more competitive market setting. Consequently, favoring competition in
some sectors, leaving monopolies in others may be detrimental for consumers. Competition may
be justiﬁed if and only if the goods produced by competitors diﬀer in quality, so that also average
quality and variance become important factors to consider.
We have also proven that, when competition is introduced in each sector, the tragedy may be
solved for relatively small numbers of competing ﬁrms in each sector if systems are close substi-
tutes, and this even in the limit case of a common quality level across systems. Unsurprisingly,
the higher the degree of substitutability and the level of competition in other sector, the more
concentrated a sector can be, while still performing better than an integrated monopoly in terms
of consumer surplus.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
In order to prove that
∂pMBk
∂γ < 0 we note ﬁrst that this is always true if α1k < α¯. In fact,
∂
∂γ
n(1−γ)
n(γ−3)−2γ =
− 2(n−1)n
(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 < 0 and
∂
∂γ
n
2n−γ =
n
(2n−γ)2 > 0. If α1k > α¯, it may be that
∂pMBk
∂γ > 0 for a suﬃciently high
value of α1k, and in particular for α1k> α˜1k, where α˜1k is obtained solving
∂pMBk
∂γ = 0 with respect to α1k.
We then check whether α˜1k is a feasible value for an above-average quality. To do that, we compute ﬁrst
the highest α1k compatible with a given average α¯, α
max
1k , which is obtained when the remaining n − 1
ﬁrms produce such low-quality systems αmin1s < α¯, s 6= k as to optimally set their price equal to marginal
cost (so that they remain active in sector B), that is pMBs = 0. From (9), we obtain:
αmin1s =
α¯(n− γ)(1 + γ)
n(3− γ)− 2γ (47)
Setting α1s = αmin1s for all ﬁrms s 6= k, we obtain αmax1k solving
(n− 1)αmin1s + αmax1k
n
= α¯ (48)
i.e., αmax1k = nα¯− (n− 1)αmin1s . Substituting such value into ∂p
M
Bk
∂γ , we have
∂pMBk
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
α1k=αmax1k
=
(n− 1)nα¯ [2γ2 − n (1 + 4γ − γ2)]
(2n− γ) [n(γ − 3) + 2]2 < 0.
Hence, αmax1k < α˜1k always and
∂pMBk
∂γ < 0 for all γ∈
[
0, nn+1
]
.
Similarly, in order to prove that
∂pMBk
∂n < 0 for all n ≥ 2, we note from (9) that ∂p
M
Bk
∂n < 0 always if
α1k > α¯, since
∂
∂n
n(1−γ)
n(3−γ)−2γ = − 2(1−γ)(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 < 0 and ∂∂n n2n−γ = − γ(2n−γ)2 < 0. If α1k < α¯, it may be
that
∂pMBk
∂n > 0 for a suﬃciently low value of α1k. We then prove that
∂pMBk
∂n < 0 at the minimum possible
value of α1k, α
min
1k . Substituting α
min
1k from (47) we obtain
∂pMBk
∂n
∣∣∣
α1k=αmin1k
= nα¯γ(γ
2−1)
(2n−γ)(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 , which
is negative for all relevant values of γ and n.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Diﬀerentiating
∂pM1k
∂α¯ = − (2γ−1)[1+(n−2)γ][3+γ(2n−5)][2+γ(2n−3)] > 0 for all γ < nn+1 .
We now prove that p¯M1k decreases with n. From (8) it can be readily veriﬁed that
∂pMA1
∂n > 0, whereas
Lemma 1 demonstrates that
∂pMBk
∂n < 0. It is then suﬃcient to prove that
∂pMA1
∂n <
∣∣∣∂pMBk∂n ∣∣∣ when ∣∣∣∂pMBk∂n ∣∣∣ takes
its minimum value (i.e., when it is closest to zero). Note ﬁrst that
∂pMBk
∂n = − γ(α1k−α¯)[2+(2n−3)γ]2 −
2(1−γ)α¯
[3+(2n−5)γ]2 ,
which reaches its minimum value when α1k = αmin1k (where α
min
1k is deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 1), since
− γ(α1k−α¯)
[2+(2n−3)γ]2 is positive and maximum at α
min
1k . It is then easy to verify that
∂pMA1
∂n −
∣∣∣∂pMBk∂n ∣∣∣
αik=αminik
=
− ¯α(1−γ)(2+4γ(n−2)+(8−7n+2n2)γ2)
(1+γ(n−1))(3+γ(2n−5))2(2+γ(2n−3)) < 0 for all γ and n.
A similar proof works for
∂pM1k
∂γ .
The eﬀect on CSM is a direct consequence of the inﬂuence of γ and n on system prices.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1). In this case α1k = α¯, (k = 1, ..., n) and σ2α = 0. From (23), consumer surplus under compe-
tition is CSM = n
2
2 A˜
2α¯2. Comparing it with consumer surplus under integrated and complementary
monopoly, given by (24) and (27), respectively, we note immediately that the diﬀerence CSM −CSIM =
α¯2n(1−γ)(n(γ−5)+4γ)
8(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 is negative, while the diﬀerence CS
M − CSCM = α¯
2(n(6γ(n−1)+γ)+5γ2)
18(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 is positive,
for all n ≥ 2 and γ ∈ [0, 1].
Part 2). When σ2α > 0, subtracting CSIM from CS
M and solving for σ2α, it is immediate to obtain
σ2CS in expression (28). When σ
2
CS < 0, competition is always preferred. The relevant case is thus
σ2CS > 0, which holds when α¯ <
αIM
2A˜n
. It can be veriﬁed that αIM <
αIM
2A˜n
, so that it is possible to have a
case in which α¯ < αIM and CS
M > CSIM .
Given that CSM is increasing in n and γ, the minimum value of σ2α required to have CS
M ≥ CSIM ,
σ2CS , must be decreasing in n and γ.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Diﬀerentiating qMik in (13) with respect to γ we get
∂qMik
∂γ
=
(n− 1)α¯
(n(3− γ)− 2γ)2 +
(2n2 + γ2 − n(1 + 2γ))(α1k − α¯)
n(1− γ)2(2n− γ)2 (49)
When n ≥ 2 and γ ∈
[
0, nn+1
]
, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (49) is positive. The second
term is positive if α1k > α¯ and negative otherwise. Thus,
∂qMik
∂γ > 0 always if α1k > α¯. If α1k < α¯,
the maximum negative value of the second term in (49) is taken when α1k reaches its minimum feasible
value, αmin1s (see equation (47) in the proof of Lemma 1). Evaluating
∂qMik
∂γ at α1k = α
min
1k we obtain
∂qMik
∂γ
∣∣∣
α1k=αmin1s
= − (n(4n−6γ−1)+γ2(2+n))(n−γ)α¯n(2n−γ)(1−γ)(n(3−γ)+2γ2 < 0. Thus, given that ∂q
M
ik
∂γ is continuous in α1k, there
exists αˆ1k < α¯ such that
∂qMik
∂γ ≥ 0 for α1k ≥ αˆ1k and negative otherwise.
Diﬀerentiating qMik in (13) with respect to n we get
∂qMik
∂n
=
((3− γ)n(2− n)− 2γ2)α¯
n2(n(3− γ)− 2γ)2 +
(2n(n− 2γ) + γ2)(α1k − α¯)
n2(γ − 1)(2n− γ)2 (50)
When n ≥ 2 and γ ∈
[
0, nn+1
]
, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (50) is negative. The second
term is negative if α1k > α¯ and positive otherwise. Thus,
∂qMik
∂n < 0 always if α1k > α¯. If α1k < α¯,
the maximum positive value for the second term of (50) occurs when α1k = αmin1k . Evaluating
∂qMik
∂n at
α1k = αmin1s we obtain
∂qMik
∂n
∣∣∣
α1k=αmin1s
= − (n−γ)γ(1−γ)α¯n(2n−γ)(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 < 0. Thus, ∂q
M
ik
∂n < 0.
Deﬁne total quantity as
QM ≡
n∑
k=1
qMik =
α¯(n− γ)
n(3− γ)− 2γ (51)
Diﬀerentiating (51) with respect to γ and n we obtain ∂Q
M
∂γ =
n(n−1)α¯
(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 > 0 and
∂QM
∂n =
γ(1−γ)α¯
(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 >
0 in the admissible range of the parameters.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Part (a). Comparing ΠMA1 in (14) and Π
A
CM in (27), we obtain Π
M
A1 − ΠACM = (n−1)α¯
2γ(n(6−γ)−5γ)
9(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 > 0
in the relevant parameters' range. We then compare ΠMA1 with the proﬁt of an integrated monopoly and
ΠMA1 − ΠIM = −nα¯(1−γ)(n(5−γ)−4γ)4(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 < 0. Note that limn→∞ΠMA1 = α¯
2
(3−γ)2 , which is in any case smaller
than ΠIM when γ ∈
[
0, nn+1
]
. Only at γ = 1 we would have ΠMA1 = ΠIM .
Part (b). From Lemmas 1 and 2, both pMBk and q
M
1k decrease with n. Then both Π
M
Bk and Π
M
B also
decrease with n.
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To prove the impact of γ on ΠMB , let us diﬀerentiate expression (17) with respect to γ. We ﬁnd:
∂ΠMB
∂γ
=
n(n(2n− 3γ) + γ(2− γ))
(2n− γ)3(1− γ)2 σ
2
α −
n(n− 1)(n+ γ(n− 2))
(n(3− γ)− 2γ)3 α¯ (52)
It might then happen that
∂ΠMB
∂γ > 0 if σ
2
α is high enough for given α¯. It is a well-known result in statistics
that the maximum variance σ2αmax in a discrete distribution is attained when
n
2 ﬁrms have quality equal
to the minimum value in the range and n2 ﬁrms have quality equal to the maximum value in the range
(see Plackett, 1947). In our speciﬁc case, the minimum value in the range is given by αmin1k , whereas the
maximum value has to be computed given the average α¯ and the fact than n2 ﬁrms produce α
min
1k . Deﬁne
such maximum αˇ =α¯
(
n− (n−γ)(1+γ)n(3−γ)−2γ
)
. Then maximun variance would be σ2max =
1
2 α¯
2
(
(1−γ)2(2n−γ)2
(n(3−γ)−2γ)2
)
+(
n− 1 + (n−γ)(1+γ)n(3−γ)−2γ
)2
. By diﬀerentiating ΠMB with respect to γ and solving the derivative with respect
to σ2α, it is possible to verify that
∂ΠMB
∂γ ≥ 0 iﬀ σ2α ≥ σ20 = (n−1)α¯
2(2n−γ)3(1−γ)2(n−2γ+nγ)
(n(3−γ)−2γ)3(2n2−3nγ−γ(1−2γ)) . To compare σ
2
0
with σ2max, we evaluate the expression σ
2
max − σ20 numerically for all admissible values of γ and we ﬁnd
that σ2max > σ
2
0 for all n ≥ 2, implying that ∂Π
M
B
∂γ > 0 for σ
2
α suﬃciently high.
Part (c). When σ2α = 0, then all systems have the same quality level α1k, k = 1, ..., n. If this level is
such that α1k = αIM = αCM , then the diﬀerence ΠMB −ΠBCM = − (n−1)α¯
2γ(3n+γ(n−4))
9(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 is always negative
in the admissible parameters' range. We know that ΠBCM < ΠIM , hence, a fortiori , Π
M
B − ΠIM < 0. As
for Producer Surplus, PS ≡ ΠMA1 + ΠMB =
α¯2[n2(2−γ)−n(3−γ)γ+γ2]
[n(3−γ)−2γ]2 . It is easy to check that PS − ΠIM =
− nα¯2(1−γ)24(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 < 0. Also, ΠMA1 + ΠMB − ΠACM − ΠBCM = PS − 2ΠiCM = (n−1)α¯
2γ(n(3−2γ)−γ)
9(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 which is
always positive in the relevant parameters' range.
Part (d). The ﬁnal result is immediate and is obtained solving ΠMBk = ΠIM with respect to σ
2
α.
Then ΠMBk ≥ ΠIM iﬀ σ2α ≥ σ2ΠB = (n−1)α¯
2(1−γ)γ(2n−γ)2(n(3+γ)−4γ)
9n(n−γ)(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 , where σ
2
ΠB
< σ2max for all n ≥ 3
(numerical evaluation for all admissible values of γ). For n = 2, σ2ΠB > σ
2
max, implying that Π
M
Bk < ΠIM .
As for Producer Surplus, the result is obtained solving ΠMA1 + Π
M
B = ΠIM with respect to σ
2
α. Then
ΠMA1 + Π
M
B ≥ ΠIM iﬀ σ2α ≥ σ2PS = nα¯
2(1−γ)2(2n−γ)2
4(n−γ)(n(3−γ)−2γ)2 . Also, it is possible to establish (through numerical
evaluation) that σ2PS < σ
2
max for all n ≥ 2.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Part (a). The proof is immediate, setting V ar(q) = 0 in (42) and comparing the resulting expression
with CSCM .
Part (b). Solving CSO −CSIM = 0 with respect to n1, i.e. n
2
1n
2
2
2 z
2q2− α∗28 = 0, yields two solutions,
n11 =
(n2−1)γ2
n2(2γ−1)−γ2 and n12 =
γ(n2(4−γ)−3γ)
n2(5−2γ)−(4−γ)γ , so that CS
O > CSIM iﬀ either n1 < n12 or n1 > n11. It
is possible to verify, however, that n12 < 1 for all γ and n2 in the admissible range of the parameters.
Therefore, CSO ≥ CSIM iﬀ n1 ≥ n11 and n11 = n∗1 in (46).
Diﬀerentiating (46) with respect to γ,
∂n∗1
∂γ = − 2(n2−1)n2(1−γ)γ(n2(1−2γ)+γ2)2 < 0, whereas diﬀerentiating it with
respect to n2 yields
∂n∗1
∂n2
= − (1−γ)2γ2(n2(1−2γ)+γ2)2 < 0.
Part (c). For this part, it suﬃces to prove that either ΠAt or ΠBk is always smaller than ΠiCM . The
other is implied by the clear symmetry. Moreover, being ΠiCM < ΠIM , this implies also that ΠAt and
ΠBk are smaller than ΠIM . By comparing ΠAt with ΠACM , we ﬁnd that
ΠAt −ΠACM =
1
9
α∗2
(
9(n1 − γ)(n2 − γ)2(1− γ)
n2(γ(n2(γ − 2) + γ) + n1(n2(3− 2γ) + (γ − 2)γ))2 − 1
)
(53)
Numerically solving (53) with respect to n1 for given values of n2 and considering all the admissible
values γ ∈
[
0, n1n2n1n2+1
]
, it is possible to check that (53) admits two solutions n˜a and n˜b and that both are
always lower than 1 when not imaginary. Simulations show that ΠAt−ΠACM ≥ 0 for n˜a ≤ n1 ≤ n˜b (when
n˜a and n˜b are real) and ΠAt−ΠACM < 0 when n˜a and n˜b are imaginary. This implies that ΠAt−ΠACM < 0
in the relevant range of the parameters. The same proof can be applied to ΠBk.
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Figure 2: Consumer surplus under three diﬀerent regimes when competition is present in both sectors.
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CSIM CSCM ΠIM ΠCM TSIM TSCM
0.125 0.055 0.25 0.22 0.375 0.275
Table 1.1: Welfare under integrated and complementary monopoly in simulation 1.
γ = 0.2
n2 = 2 n2 = 3 n2 = 4 n2 = 5 n2 = 6 n2 = 7 n2 = 8 n2 = 9 n2 = 10
pA1 0.32 0.324 0.325 0.326 0.327 0.3277 0.328 0.3285 0.3286
pB1 0.32 0.31 0.308 0.306 0.305 0.304 0.303 0.302 0.301
p11 0.64 0.634 0.633 0.632 0.632 0.6317 0.631 0.6305 0.6296
q11 0.09 0.06 0.045 0.036 0.03 0.026 0.023 0.02 0.018
CSO 0.0648 0.0663 0.067 0.0675 0.0677 0.0679 0.0681 0.0682 0.0683
ΠA1 0.0576 0.0589 0.0595 0.0599 0.0602 0.0604 0.0605 0.0606 0.0607
ΠB1 0.0576 0.0378 0.0282 0.0224 0.0186 0.0156 0.0139 0.0124 0.0111
ΠO 0.2304 0.2315 0.2321 0.2324 0.2326 0.2327 0.2328 0.2329 0.2330
TSO 0.295 0.298 0.2991 0.2999 0.3 0.3007 0.3009 0.3012 0.3013
γ = 0.62
pA1 0.2621 0.2713 0.2753 0.2775 0.2789 0.2798 0.2806 0.2811 0.2816
pB1 0.2621 0.2359 0.2248 0.2186 0.2146 0.2119 0.2098 0.2083 0.2781
p11 0.5242 0.5073 0.5001 0.4961 0.4935 0.4918 0.4905 0.4895 0.4887
q11 0.1189 0.0821 0.0624 0.0504 0.0422 0.0363 0.0318 0.0283 0.0255
CSO 0.1132 0.1213 0.1249 0.1269 0.1282 0.1291 0.1298 0.1303 0.1307
ΠA1 0.0623 0.0668 0.0688 0.0699 0.0706 0.0711 0.0715 0.0717 0.0719
ΠB1 0.0623 0.0387 0.0281 0.0220 0.0181 0.0154 0.0134 0.0118 0.0106
ΠO 0.2494 0.24995 0.25 0.24998 0.24995 0.24993 0.2499 0.24989 0.24987
TSO 0.3626 0.3713 0.3749 0.3769 0.3782 0.3791 0.3797 0.3802 0.3806
Table 1.2: Impact of competition when ﬁrms are homogeneous.
γ = 0.2 γ = 0.62
n2 = 2 n2 = 3 n2 = 4 n2 = 5
pA1 2.69 2.80 2.90 2.99
pB1 2.69 2.32 2.24 2.17
p11 5.38 5.12 5.14 5.16
q11 0.72 0.42 0.27 0.18
CSO 4.33 4.84 5.38 5.97
CSIM 8 8.51 9.03 9.57
CSCM 3.55 3.78 4.01 4.25
ΠA1 4.07 4.42 4.72 5.02
ΠB1 4.07 2.09 1.48 1.13
ΠO 14.78 15.83 16.88 17.96
ΠIM 16 17.01 18.06 19.14
ΠCM 14.22 15.125 16.05 17.01
TS0 19.11 20.67 22.27 23.94
TSIM 24 25.52 27.09 28.72
TSCM 17.78 18.91 20.07 21.27
n2 = 2 n2 = 3 n2 = 4 n2 = 5
2.24 2.39 2.49 2.58
2.24 1.67 1.50 1.38
4.49 4.06 3.99 3.96
0.95 0.51 0.28 0.14
7.66 9 10.21 11.47
8 8.51 9.03 9.57
3.55 3.79 4.01 4.25
4.57 5.17 5.62 6.02
4.57 1.94 1.26 0.88
16.04 17.16 18.31 19.51
16 17 18.06 19.14
14.22 15.12 16.05 17.01
23.70 26.16 28.52 30.98
24 25.52 27.09 28.71
17.78 18.91 20.07 21.27
Table 2: Impact of competition when ﬁrms are heterogeneous and competition increases quality.
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γ = 0.2 γ = 0.62
n2 = 2 n2 = 3 n2 = 4 n2 = 5
pA1 3.17 3.12 3.06 2.99
pB1 3.17 3.14 3.16 3.19
p11 6.34 6.26 6.22 6.18
q11 1.1 0.8 0.65 0.56
CSO 6.03 6 5.97 5.96
CSIM 11.3 10.7 10.12 9.57
CSCM 5 4.75 4.5 4.25
ΠA1 5.65 5.5 5.27 5.02
ΠB1 5.65 3.84 2.96 2.44
ΠO 20.83 19.88 18.91 17.97
ΠIM 22.56 21.39 20.25 19.14
ΠCM 20.05 19.01 18 17
TS0 26.86 27.13 24.88 23.94
TSIM 33.86 32.08 30.37 28.71
TSCM 25.07 23.77 22.5 21.27
n2 = 2 n2 = 3 n2 = 4 n2 = 5
2.64 2.66 2.62 -
2.64 2.46 2.43 -
5.28 5.12 5.05 -
1.65 1.27 1.07 -
10.63 11.12 11.3 -
11.28 10.7 10.12 -
5 4.75 4.5 -
6.32 6.41 6.25 -
6.32 4.22 3.28 -
22.6 21.5 20.5 -
22.6 21.4 20.25 -
20 19 18 -
33.22 32.66 31.8 -
33.84 32.08 30.04 -
27.07 23.77 22.5 -
Table 3: Impact of competition when ﬁrms are heterogeneous and competition decreases
quality.
28
 
